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The disappearance of flight MH370 is possibly the greatest mystery in aviation history. A 
large zone in the Southern Indian Ocean was searched unsuccessfully leaving an open case 
and an unacceptable situation for the family members. We discuss the scientific difficulties 
with locating the plane through satellite data and develop an improved analysis using least 
square curve fitting of analytical non-Euclidean route equations providing robust topology-
optimization with perturbation theory handling satellite movement. We find four 
independent solutions with the final part of the flight following a great circle. Two are 
located in stable minima for the error-function, and two unstable ones agree poorly with 
most data. One stable solution coincides with the Inmarsat-result near the end of the search-
zone addendum, but fails to explain additional data. Our best solution leads to an entirely 
different location agreeing with other data from debris, acoustics and an eyewitness report, 
providing a clear conclusion where to find the plane. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION.  After contact was lost with flight MH370 on the route from Kuala 
Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014 the only available data concerning its route came from 
a military radar facility in Malaysia (News, 2017) and a number of handshakes with a 
satellite from Inmarsat (Ashton et al., 2014). Radar data tells us that after shutting down 
transponders and communication systems it made a sharp turn and flew along the border to 
Thailand, past Penang to the waypoint MEKAR in the Malacca Strait where military radar 
lost contact (News, 2017). Then the satellite handshakes restarted after interruption of the 
satellite unit (SDU), possibly due to a power failure. The handshakes provide accurate time 
differences and thereby distances to the satellite 3F1 at approximately geostationary 
location west of the Maldives, represented by so-called Burst Time Offset (BTO) (Ashton 
et al., 2014). The sum of the Doppler shifts for the communication loop was also measured 
and the local Doppler shift from the airplane movement deduced through the Burst 
Frequency Offset (BFO). Since these represent frequency shifts due to the radial projection 
of the movement of the plane, measured simultaneously with BTO at roughly one hour 
intervals after the reboot, and two data points due to attempted phone calls, it is possible to 
deduce some route information. However, the accuracy of the Doppler shifts (1% of the 
maximum value) was believed insufficient to determine a precise route. 
  If the satellite were perfectly geostationary we would have been practically stuck here, 
since we could only conclude that it reached a certain distance from the last BTO, giving 
roughly a circle called the 7th arc after numbering the handshakes. This corresponds to 2662 
nmi (nautical mile (nmi) = 1.852 km) along a spherical earth surface from the ground 
projection of 3F1. This arc is cut around 55% shorter due to the maximum fuel range of the 
plane but still represents an unsurmountable difficulty to search, particularly when allowing 
for moderate movement from the last handshake to the end. In other words the plane 
effectively disappeared. Physically this is easy to understand, since the satellite 
measurements only provide radial information, but no direction. 
  Fortunately the satellite is not completely ideal and wanders, predominantly in north-south 
direction (Ashton et al., 2014), and the maximum speed and minimum turning radius for 
the plane also give some guidance. During most of the flight the satellite moved south after 
reaching its northern extremum roughly an hour after the SDU restarted. This opens the 
possibility to distinguish between northern and southern flight routes since the perturbation 
to the relative airplane velocity (for SDU-satellite Doppler shift) has opposite sign for 
northern and southern routes. For routes going straight north or south this gives a 10% 
difference. This is ten times the measurement uncertainty for the BFO leaving no doubt 
routes going straight north are inconsistent with the data, as shown by Ashton (2014). 
Routes towards northeast are even worse. However, in north-western direction there is a 
chance of a route with poor fit and range near the acceptance limit because the east-west 
satellite movement mixes with the north-south movement relaxing fitting conditions. We 
initially ignore this type of solution since it is unlikely that any airplane could penetrate 
radar surveillance by several countries including India and China on a north-western route. 
Also it would have to fly at relatively low speed along a curved route to fit the data, and 
thereby be forced to, but at the same time practically unable to, pass the tall mountains in 
Himalaya. In addition some of the phones belonging to the passengers would likely have 
been on and left electronic footprints by handshakes with the Chinese network. Finally all 
debris would have to be planted. Later we develop a simple test to find all remaining 
solutions and settle the issue rigorously. This leads us to conclude that only one of the 
solutions is correct, and define a new and dramatically smaller search zone near Christmas 
Island. This also explains why all searching until now was unsuccessful. 
 
 
2. ANALYSIS OF SATELLITE DATA. Soon after military radar contact was lost the SDU 
restarted unexpectedly. After some time without power it was cold, so it rebooted and 
reheated simultaneously leading to some highly unreliable handshakes (BTO/BFO) due to 
temperature drift. These points must be discarded. Around 18:28 UTC the measurement 
quality was improving in agreement with results from previous SDU cold-starts (Holland, 
2017). At 18:40 Malaysia Airlines called the plane via satellite phone. It was not answered 
but provided a BFO value and defined the starting point for the hourly handshakes. 
Unfortunately telephone calls give no BTO (Ashton et al., 2014). Since the airplane had 
moved from MEKAR so its height, speed and course were no longer known independently 
from radar data, it is impossible to extract precise knowledge from these two points without 
making assumptions or having additional knowledge. It is therefore not until the first 
regular handshake at 19:41 that complete and precise data is available for systematic 
analysis. 
 
  
Figure 1.  Equation (1) compared to the radial distances 𝑅 ൌ 𝑅௘௫௣ on a spherical earth. 
 
  At 18:28 there are two qualitative options: A northern or a southern route. The handshake 
at 18:28 allows for these two solutions to a quadratic equation. Concerning the route after 
18:28 the BFO at 18:40 provides some selection among the possibilities but unfortunately 
the problem is underdetermined and the data too inaccurate to distinguish between north 
and south. Importantly the rest of the points look like they are located on a straight line 
with constant speed when considering the BTO values. If one converts the BTO values to 
distances, R, along the earth surface from the satellite ground projection using equations 
(3) and (4), these are modelled well by a simple equation describing a straight line on a flat 
earth with an exclusively transverse speed of v = 800 km/h, starting at t1 (19:41) 
𝑅 ൌ 1758𝑛𝑚𝑖ට1 ൅ ൫0.2457ሺ𝑡 െ 𝑡ଵሻ൯ଶ (1) 
where the front factor is R at t1 = 19:41 and the value 0.2457 is the ratio of v and R(t1). This 
is a strong lead, in particular since the agreement with measured values is good as shown 
in figure 1. Furthermore, the BFO values also agree with expectations from such a straight 
flight, but with less precision, and with the exception of 19:41, which has movement 
towards the satellite rather than away from it as the rest of the points, compared to zero 
movement as equation (1) predicts. In fact it is impossible to reconcile the BFO and BTO 
information at 19:41 without assuming one of the following: 
 
1) The point at 19:41 is not at all on the same straight line as the rest. 
2) There is roughly 10-degree heading change between 19:41 and 20:41. 
3) The minimum distance to the satellite lies between 19:41 and 20:41. 
4) There is a U-turn between 19:41 and 20:41. 
 
  We combined BTO and BFO information in a detailed mathematical analysis to gain 
deeper insight and found the sign-change for the aircraft Doppler-shift of key importance 
to select the correct option. 
  We eliminate two of the four possibilities by initially considering a flat earth, and improve 
by a Taylor expansion of the spherical solution. For a flat earth the surface angle towards 
the satellite ground projection, 𝜃, is linked to the speed, v, and radius along the earth surface 
from the ground projection, R, by 
0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 4,5
1800
1950
2100
2250
2400
2550
2700
R (
nm
i)
Time (h)
 Rexp
 Eq. (1)
 
1.1 ∙ 𝑅𝑅௃ଶ ∙ 𝑣 cos 𝜃 ൌ 1.1 ∙ ቆ
𝑣
𝑅௃ቇ
ଶ
∙ ሺ𝑡 െ 𝑡଴ሻ (2) 
where RJ is the earth radius and v the airplane speed. Using that vꞏcos(𝜃) is proportional to 
the Doppler shift we plot this relationship in figure 2 against time, t, measured from 19:41 
using the BFO values converted to Doppler shifts (Ashton et al., 2014) and the R-values. 
We find a relatively good linear fit for all the later points but a poor one for 19:41, and 
moderate deviation for 20:41. By replacing the simplified flat earth version (2), which is 
only valid for short distances, with a spherical solution derived from equations (7) and (8) 
and Taylor expanded to second order in the point at 22:41 (the best approximation which 
is still a straight line, and labelled equation 2A) one finds a nice fit from 20:41 as shown in 
the same figure. Equation (2) is multiplied by 1.1 to match the simple equation with the 
optimally Taylor-expanded Doppler shifts at short distances. A linear fit gives v = 784 km/h 
using the Taylor formula. As illustrated, the point at 19:41 deviates by a Doppler sign 
change (indicating U-turn) and is therefore not included in the fit. Instead we find the 
natural zero-point, t0, at -0.61 hours (before 19:41) eliminating option 3, since the minimum 
satellite distance, Rmin, and corresponding sign change must occur at t0. Agreement with 
equation (1) and sign change at t = 0 makes option 1 impossible. This leaves us only with 
options 2 or 4 (most likely 4). These lead to solutions in the Southern Indian Ocean and the 
Eastern Indian Ocean respectively, while the Iannello solution (Iannello and Godfrey, 
2016) can be connected to both options. 
 
  
Figure 2.  Data points from equation (2) using a flat earth description (red circles), and a second-order 
Taylor expansion (2A) of the spherical equation at 22:41 (black squares) providing the most accurate linear 
description for all distances, plotted against time after 19:41 and fitted with a straight line illustrating that 
the point at 19:41 would fit much better if the Doppler-effect changes sign due to U-turn soon after 19:41. 
 
  After establishing this overview of possible solutions we perform the detailed analysis of 
the rest of the data. The analytical connection between the satellite position, the BTO value 
and the radius, R, along the earth surface from the satellite ground projection to the airplane 
is given by Ashton (2014) and Steel (2016) 
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𝑅௦௔௧ ൌ 𝑐2 ሺ𝐵𝑇𝑂 െ 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠ሻ െ 𝑅௦௔௧ି௉௘௥௧௛ (4) 
where Rsat is the line-of-sight distance from the satellite to the airplane, RJ = 6378 km is the 
earth radius, H is the satellite height above earth, h is the flying height, c is the speed of 
light, bias is an internal Inmarsat parameter and Rsat-Perth the distance from the satellite to 
the relay station. We calculate R for a spherical earth model to simplify the non-Euclidean 
equations. Finally we make oblate projections (Wikipedia-1) to place them on the true 
earth. Please note that the R values do not agree with a table originally published in the 
blog of (Steel, 2016) and later deleted. According to our calculations those values had up 
to one percent error. 
  All Doppler-shifts are classical, since it is safe to ignore relativistic contributions, 
atmospheric influence and gravitational shifts, which are all at least 30 times below the 
measurement uncertainty. We calculate the Doppler-shift from the change in the line-of-
sight distance between the airplane and the satellite by differentiation of equation (3), 
initially ignoring the satellite earth-projection movement 
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where 𝜃 is the angle between R and the flight direction. We use h = 11 km, ignore height 
changes until the 7th arc, and assume H >> RJ >> h. This flight height was chosen after 
optimizing the entire problem (Plougmann and Kristensen, 2004) with h fixed at 10, 11 and 
12 km respectively, and finding slightly better fit for both stable solutions at 11 km (most 
pronounced south-easterly). In addition to the expected Doppler-shift due to the airplane 
velocity with respect to the satellite there is a height contribution from the satellite. It is 
unclear how Inmarsat handled this contribution. They split up the Doppler shift into two 
contributions: One entirely due to the satellite and one entirely due to the plane. Strictly 
speaking this is wrong since Doppler-shift is a relative effect as pointed out by (Einstein, 
1905), since the Doppler-effect depends only on the relative motion of source and receiver. 
One can circumvent this by choosing a suitable inertial-system as reference. However, 
Inmarsat has not made a well-defined choice of inertial-system. If we calculate the 
contribution from the satellite ground-projection movement relative to its most northern 
point, (not an inertial system because of earth rotation) we get agreement with their satellite 
contribution except for last decimal round-off and the point at 21:41 where there is a 
somewhat larger deviation. This issue cannot be ignored since our model is so accurate that 
even the last decimal matters, and the deviation at 21:41 is more than 2σ for the BFO for 
other routes than Inmarsat’s route where everything fits. We tried to add the satellite height 
change, but this makes agreement worse. Therefore we have chosen to ignore the height-
change and add its maximum size linearly to the error-bar leading to a doubling of σ for the 
BFO. This only moves the predicted crash site a few km, so we can live with it. Under these 
conditions and using equation (5) the airplane Doppler shift, ∆𝜈, is 
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𝑅௡෪
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෪൯ (6) 
where ν0 = 1646652500 Hz is the communication frequency (Ashton et al., 2014), and 
experimental numbers including perturbation effects from satellite movement are 
symbolized with a tilde over the variables (𝑅,෩  𝜃෨). We think using a detailed recipe from 
Inmarsat the σ enlargement can be avoided and the agreement will be better for 21:41. The 
published Inmarsat procedure is perfect for their specific route but potentially problematic 
for other routes. However, an alternative possibility is that the plane passed a thunderstorm 
at 21:41. 
 
Table 1.  First order perturbations from the satellite movement on R, v (along R) and 𝜃 for the two solutions 
towards 13.3˚S and 34.6˚S using values from (Ashton et al., 2014) and our own recalculations. 
 
Satellite 
perturbation Solution towards 13.3˚S Solution towards 34.6˚S 
Time (UTC) -ΔR (nmi) -vR (km/h) ∆𝜃 ሺ°ሻ -ΔR (nmi) -vR (km/h) ∆𝜃 ሺ°ሻ 
20:41:05 -1.54 -3.94 0.113 0.6 3 0.02 
21:41:27 -1.72 -2.09 0.410 6 12 0.19 
22:41:22 2.48 3.85 0.785 18 21 0.47 
00:11:00 18.71 14.48 1.304 48 34 1.02 
 
  After calculating the values of R and Δν we take the perturbations from the satellite 
ground-projection movement into account. We use classical first order perturbation theory 
(Stewart, 1990) to find the projection on the individual R values and satellite Doppler-effect 
for two solutions going south and southeast in table 1. By subtracting the perturbations 
from the measured values we get the unperturbed result for a spherical earth in case the 
direction is correct. After a couple of tries we found that we only arrive at self-consistent 
routes with good fits in two directions. In addition we found indication of a third solution 
between them, but its error (χ2) minimum is too shallow for a stable fit as shown in figure 
3. Starting at any other direction leads to an iterative convergence towards one of the two 
stable solutions. South of the shallow minimum converging to the southern solution and 
north of it to the south-eastern solution, both after 3-4 iterations where the satellite 
perturbations are recalculated for each iteration. 
 
Table 2.  Fitting results with equations (6-8) for the solutions towards 13.3˚S and 34.6˚S with 
 𝜒௏.ூ.ଶ  = 31.7 nmi2 and σDoppler = 15 Hz, giving 𝜒௦௧௔௧௜௦௧௜௖௔௟ଶ  = 1.25 nmi2.  
Route t0 (h) v (km/h) Rmin (nmi) 
𝜒ோଶ (nmi2) 
𝜒ଶ 
(nmi2) 𝜃଺෪  ሺ°ሻ 
13.3˚S -0.4709±0.0035 796.87±0.50 1661.6±1.2 0.475 0.845 43.294±0.030 
34.6˚S -0.3800±0.0035 822.74±0.50 1675.8±1.6 2.64 2.86 42.963±0.035 
 
  To extract precise end-points for the solutions we used simultaneous least square curve 
fitting of exact analytical expressions for R and 𝜃(t) derived from spherical Non-Euclidean 
algebra. We fitted R- and Doppler-values simultaneously to expressions for a right-angled 
triangle with minimum satellite distance Rmin and flight length v(t-t0) on a spherical earth 
for the angle 𝜃଺෪ in the lower end of the triangle with 1000 times less weight on the Doppler-part of χ2 than on the precise R-part with free parameters Rmin, v and t0. The analytical 
expressions in the spherical approximation without satellite movement are given by 
(Wikipedia-2): 
cos ቆ𝑅ሺ𝑡௡ሻ𝑅௃ ቇ ൌ cos ቆ
𝑅௠௜௡
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𝑣ሺ𝑡௡ െ 𝑡଴ሻ
𝑅௃ ቇ 
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 (8) 
  For continuous calculations tn is replaced by t and 𝜃௡ by 𝜃. Complete expressions including perturbation from satellite movement are symbolized with a tilde over the 
variables (𝑅,෩  𝜃෨). The fitting parameters for the southern and south-eastern routes are listed 
in table 2 together with 𝜒ோଶ for the R-contribution and χ2 for the entire fit. Exclusively 21:41, 22:41, 23:14 and 00:11 were used for the fits, since only for these points we are sure of a 
straight flight with constant speed. χ2 shows the best fit for the south-eastern route. This 
value is 3.4 times lower than for the southern route (Ashton et al., 2014). The statistical χ2 
due to measurement uncertainty is roughly 1.5 times our best value, meaning both are 
within the expected uncertainty range, with the southern around the upper statistical limit. 
The fitted values for 𝑅෨  and ∆𝜈 are listed in table 3 where the perturbations are added back 
facilitating comparison with raw data. 
 
Table 3.  Fitted values for 𝑅෨ and ∆𝜈 where the perturbations are added back, and the Doppler-shift 
calculated for all relevant points using a southern route for ∆𝜈 simplifying comparison with raw data. 
 
 Solution towards 13.3˚S Solution towards 34.6˚S 
Time 
(UTC) 
Δν 
(Hz) 
Deviation 
(Hz) 
𝑅෨   
(nmi) 
Dev. 
(nmi) 
Δν 
(Hz) 
Deviation 
(Hz) 
𝑅෨ 
(nmi) 
Dev. 
(nmi) 
21:41:27 -385 -18 (±15) 1) 1952.96 0.46 -377 -10 (±7) 1953.5 1.0 
22:41:22 -522 -1 (±15) 2192.77 -0.43 -521 0 (±7) 2192.2 -1.0 
23:14:00 -594 6 (±15) 2342.3 - -589 11 (±7) 2341.6 - 
00:11:00 -705 -3 (±15) 2620.58 0.28 -703 -1 (±7) 2621.1 0.8 
00:19:29 -721 70 (±15) *) 2664.55 2.55 *) -718 73 (±7) *) 2664.5 2.5 *) 
 
1) Larger deviation perhaps due to passage of a thunderstorm as the plane entered the intertropical 
convergence zone (Schneider et al., 2014) 
*) Due to flame out (irrelevant for fit quality) 
 
  The last task is projecting the results on earth which is slightly oblate due to rotation. This 
is done using formulas for the radii of curvature in the relevant directions and for the 
relevant latitudes (Wikipedia-1) to convert distances to oblate geometry. Table 4 lists 
relevant modified R-values. After correction we manually placed the solutions on the earth 
surface using Google Maps (GM) by demanding that all distances and angles should fit as 
shown in figure 4 for the south-eastern solution. The southern solution becomes practically 
identical to the Inmarsat solution with a deviation on the 6th and 7th arcs of only 21 km and 
an end point at (34.591˚ South, 93.161˚ East). This means that there is no reason to refit the 
initial part of this solution and fine-adjust the rest, since everything will be practically 
identical to the findings of Ashton (2014). 
 
  
Figure 3.  Sketch of the angle 𝜃଺෪ (full line) and 𝜒ଶ (dashed line) as a function of φ (angle from east to south from satellite ground projection at 00:11 to 6th arc crossing) with the search-zones highlighted by coloured 
lines with thickness roughly proportional to the zone width. Three routes to the south-eastern quarter of the 
6th arc are labelled and indicated with red circles, The two stable solutions are connected with a dashed red 
line to illustrate how the angular dependence determines the local length of the search zone in the same way 
as dispersion determines the width of an optical filter, where large dispersion gives a narrow filter 
(Plougmann and Kristensen, 2004). The dash-dotted blue line is the measurement uncertainty. The search 
zone (ATSB, 2017) had small angular dependence and high 𝜒ଶ with small chance of finding the airplane. 
 
 
Table 4.  R-values corrected to oblate earth. 
 
Oblate correction of R for 
placing on earth 𝑅෨௠௜௡௢௕௟௔௧௘ (nmi) 𝑅෨଺௢௕௟௔௧௘ (nmi) 𝑅෨଻௢௕௟௔௧௘ (nmi)  *) 
Solution towards 13.3˚S 1658.03 2618.98 2661.6 
Solution towards 34.6˚S 1675.8 2612.6 2654.6 
 
*) Using average of model and measured value as end-position 
 
  
Figure 4.  GM illustration of the entire south-eastern solution including the initial part from MEKAR via the 
U-turn to the merging point near Bandar Aceh with the airplane coordinates when handshakes took place. 
  For the south-eastern solution we combined the radar data at MEKAR with the handshakes 
at 18:28, 19:41 and 20:41, and the BFO value at 18:40 with a U-turn soon after 19:41 and 
a final merger with the straight route soon after 20:41 (with a small delay to match) to 
construct the initial part of the route. After several attempts we are convinced there is only 
little room for different solutions, but minor deviations (up to ±10 km) are possible. In fact 
many solutions in south-easterly directions can be made to follow straight lines by 
introducing a few minutes delay near Bandar Aceh in contrast to the conclusions by 
Inmarsat, but with significantly worse fitting quality than our particular solution. In 
addition we extrapolated the fit to 00:19:29 in the other end and found almost perfect 
agreement with the R-value, while the Doppler-shift deviated significantly downwards, as 
expected for an engine flame-out (Holland, 2017). We choose a middle point as our best 
guess for the crash-position (13.279˚ South, 106.964˚ East). 
 
 
3. MATHEMATICAL TESTING OF THE VALIDITY AND PLACING OF THE 
STABLE SOLUTIONS USING ELLIPTICAL TRIANGLES. We derived analytical 
solutions to complete an elliptical triangle including satellite perturbations by adding the 
small triangle formed by the net satellite movement in the upper corner as illustrated in 
figure 5. The first and last positions are at Rmin and 𝑅଺෪ (6th arc), where Rmin is linked up to the most northern satellite position. The small triangle is handled with simple Euclidean 
geometry. We use the non-Euclidean value for the angular sum in the combined triangle 
with area, A, extracted from GM by back-extrapolation of the Rmin and 𝑅଺෪ lines to their crossing point O as sketched in figure 5. The resulting equations are 
90° ൅ 𝜃଺෪ ൅ 𝛾 ൌ 180° ቆ1 ൅ 𝐴𝜋𝑅௃ଶቇ 
(9) 
𝑎଴ ൌ 𝑟௦sin 𝛾 sinሺ92.679° െ 𝜑ሻ (10) 
𝑎଺ ൌ 𝑟௦sin 𝛾 sinሺ87.321° െ 𝛾 ൅ 𝜑ሻ (11) 
where rs = 115.748 km is the length of the linear satellite projection movement from 19:41 
to 00:11, γ is the top angle at O for both triangles, φ is the angle from east at the satellite 
projection point at 00:11 in clockwise direction to the airplane position at the 6th arc, a0 is 
the length of the back-extension of Rmin to O and a6 is the extension distance of 𝑅଺෪ back to 
O. We again use the tilde to illustrate that the satellite ground projection movement is added 
back on, since we are here placing the solution on earth using the true satellite projections 
as fix-points. Equation (9) is based on (Wikipedia-1), while we have derived (10) and (11) 
using the information above and the data on satellite projection movement. (𝜃଺෪, A) assume the values (43.294˚, 6.678ꞏ106 km2) and (42.963˚, 6.729ꞏ106 km2) for the south-eastern and 
southern solutions at the 6th arc respectively. 
 
  
Figure 5.  Sketch of the composition of the small (satellite movement) triangle used to complete a spherical 
triangle for Pythagoras-testing of the placing and validity of the stable solutions. The dash-dotted part of the 
large right-angled triangle is deliberately drawn too small, and the satellite projection is added as a curved 
arrow (in movement direction) with the relevant start- and end-points marked by filled blue circles. 
 
  Equations (10) and (11) are used as independent checks of the solution (assuming 
negligible change in A as a function of φ near optimum), and the accuracy of the GM 
placing by comparing the values of φ, a0 and a6 from GM and (10) and (11). The first is 
done by insertion into equation (7) which is used as a non-Euclidean analogue of 
Pythagoras (Wikipedia-2). For the two stable solutions we find φ = 19.3˚ and φ = 51.6˚ 
respectively by demanding exact validity of (7) for the large triangle. The south-eastern 
solution agrees within 20 km with GM, while the southern solution deviates almost 200 
km. The reason is that this region has large non-Euclidean modification due to rapid 
changes in A and relatively large oblate correction factors (see table 4). All values of a0 and 
a6 agree within 0.8 % with (10) and (11), except a0 in the southern solution which deviates 
almost 6 % (for the same non-Euclidean and oblate reasons). We have hereby performed 
tests of the validity and placing of our stable solutions. 
 
 
4.  OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS SATISFYING THE SATELLITE DATA.  In order 
to be completely sure we find all possible solutions (candidate routes) for the model we 
derive formulas for identifying additional (unstable) solutions. Here larger approximations 
are made, so the result only allows crudely estimating 6th arc points within 250 km along 
it. The radial precision is still conserved. 
  First order perturbation treatment of the average movement of the satellite during the flight 
tells us that flights directed 3˚ south (from satellite ground projection) have minimum net 
sensitivity to satellite movement. All other flight routes will be affected predominantly by 
the satellite movement perpendicular to this direction. The velocity, v0, going into the 
Doppler-effect is therefore given by 
𝛾
𝑟௦
𝑂 𝑎଴
𝑎଺
𝜑
𝑅௠௜௡
𝑅଺෪
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𝑣଴ሺ௣ሻ ൌ 𝑣 ൅ 𝑣௦௔௧ sinሺ𝜑 െ 3°ሻ (12) 
  This velocity will contribute to the Doppler-effect through its cosine projection along R 
given by 
𝑣଴ሺ௣ሻ cos ቀ𝜃଺ሺ௣ሻ෪ ቁ ൌ 𝑣஽௢௣௣௟௘௥ (13) 
vsat ≈ -50 km/h near 6th arc, meaning that the Doppler-effect is reduced for flights in 
southerly direction, so they need higher v to give the same Doppler-effect. The index (p) 
labels three different solution types: 
 
p=1: Normal speed routes: The flight joins up with the model-line after the Rmin-point at t0 
(so t0 is negative) 
p=2: High speed routes: Near airplane performance limit, joining up before Rmin (giving 
positive or zero t0). 
p=3: Low speed routes: Unrealistic curved routes with small v and 𝜃଺ሺଷሻ෪ , typical speeds around 650 km/h. 
 
  The optimum values for this simplified model are determined from the three known 
solutions: 
 
vsat = -56.3 km/h, v0(1) = 780.5 km/h, vDoppler = 571.2 km/h, v0(2) = 845.5 km/h 
 
  As a test we independently find (due to surplus information) vV.I. = 879.9 km/h, which is 
close to the value used by (Iannello and Godfrey, 2016). Because the exact starting point is 
unknown the largest uncertainty associated with using this simple model is the 
determination of 𝜃଺ሺ௣ሻ෪ . For eventual extra southern routes we chose a virtual starting point at a strategic position in the middle of the southern mouth of the Malacca Strait (west of 
Bandar Aceh) which all routes must (roughly) pass through. Using this we find no 
additional solutions within the fuel range, confirming that the solution is complete in 
southerly directions. 
  For northern directions we use MEKAR as starting point and find four optional solutions. 
Two are unphysical (strongly curved and/or zig-zag) routes ending in the Yunnan province 
of China and one leading to western Kazakhstan is outside the fuel range. The last one 
towards a 6th arc crossing at (43.87˚ North, 70.06˚ East) in south-eastern Kazakhstan is 
almost possible, but is ruled out by impossible timing and/or flame-out before 6th arc 
without unrealistically strong tail wind against the global trade winds (Schneider et al., 
2014) during the first half of the route in addition to the difficulties mentioned before. 
  The solution by Iannello and Godfrey (2016) is timely even though it includes loiter or a 
U-turn near Perka. However, a large 𝜒ோଶ speaks against it. The total χ2 is 37.5 times higher than our best solution and 25 times above the measurement uncertainty. It also suffers from 
relatively poor agreement with some of the additional data. Most importantly, it balances 
on a mathematical knife-edge. Normally there are two such solutions as in northerly 
direction but this one lies at the bifurcation point where there is exactly one (double root). 
A location near the bifurcation leaves little room for improvement. The reason is that it 
uses maximum speed to match the marginal angle in this area. In conclusion, we find this 
type of solution an unlikely candidate for the flight route. 
  After effectively completing this manuscript (Iannello, 2017) published a more elaborate 
analysis which fits better. However, it displays 𝜒ோ  making the deviation look smaller than 
𝜒ோଶ and includes all points from 19:41, which lifts the bottom level for 𝜒ோ  so the curve looks very flat, surprising some of the bloggers. This illustrates how essential it is to exclude 
19:41 to find the south-easterly solution with the U-turn. If one includes 20:41, it is possible 
to find this solution but the fit is systematically poor without delay and a small direction 
change between 20:41 and 21:41. 
 
 
5. INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE ANALYSIS.  
We use all other publically available data to choose between the two stable solutions. There 
are mixed opinions on the debris beaching (Iannello, 2017), but several reports conclude it 
fits better the further north one gets the crash as long as it is not near the Indonesian coast. 
This goes for back-tracing of the flaperon from Reunion performed by Geomar in (2015) 
and (2016), a report from a group of oceanographers (Theguardian, 2016) and back-tracing 
of temporarily beached debris performed by (Chillit, 2018). In addition nothing was found 
during the aerial search or the seabed search in the official search zone (including its later 
extension), which (in combination) effectively covered most high-probability area near the 
Inmarsat and Iannello solutions. Together these issues make southern routes more than an 
order of magnitude less probable than the south-eastern route. 
  Analysis of the flaperon biofouling also delivers important results (Wise, 2018). There 
was only one species present (tropical Goose barnacles). Furthermore Ca/Mg analysis of a 
large barnacle shell (Dailymail, 2016) and (ATSB, 2017) shows that it experienced an 
unusual thermal history with initially very high temperatures then dropping to values near 
its extinction limit of 18˚C and then gradually rising to values typical for Reunion. No one 
has been able to come up with a good explanation for this peculiar result. However, looking 
at sea currents and temperature world maps (Hunter, 2013) this kind of behaviour is 
possible when starting out near our south-eastern solution in the fall. Here a weak current 
of hot, nutrient-poor tropical water from north carries water towards south amplified by 
hurricanes (Chillit, 2018) and global warming (Feng et al., 2013), where it meets and mixes 
with the relatively cool and strong Western Australian current coming from the south. The 
mixed current continues via Reunion to Africa under heating by tropical sunshine. 
Therefore debris coming from this area is settled mostly by tropical barnacles and will 
experience such a temperature profile when starting in March. The temperature drop is 
intensified and prolonged by the onset of winter. Therefore the barnacle results add roughly 
another order of magnitude preference for the south-eastern solution. 
  The only weak point of this simplified analysis is that the barnacles seem to be much too 
young (only a few months) judging from their size. However, one must remember that their 
growth-rate depends on two parameters – temperature and available nutrients. During the 
initial part of their life the temperature was ideal for growth, but with only small amounts 
of nutrients leading to a relatively slow growth. During the middle part they practically 
went into hibernation due to temperatures approaching their extinction limit. Finally, they 
drifted towards Reunion and grew increasingly rapidly. This explanation also clarifies 
another issue namely why some of the barnacles grew above the water line. Most likely, 
there were temporarily a much larger number of tropical barnacles on the flaperon weighing 
it down and preventing settlement of other barnacles during the winter. However, during 
the cooler period most of the initial barnacles died and later fell off leaving a few alive 
above the water line. Most likely the same happened for other debris, which explains why 
it was much cleaner than usual, leading some investigators to believe that the debris was 
planted. In case the crash had happened at the Inmarsat position the flaperon would have 
been gradually covered by a variety of different biofouling with origin in increasingly 
warmer climate-zones resulting in high biodiversity. 
  However the line of circumstantial evidence does not stop here where some readers may 
already be convinced. Depending on the finer details the official investigators estimated 
(Holland, 2017) that the crash starts between 00:19:29 and 00:19:37 where the plane is 
losing height somewhere between 15700 feet/min (fpm) and 25300 fpm indicating 
insignificant pilot control. The average downward speed will most likely be below the 
middle of this interval since a crash at 25000 fpm would probably give smaller pieces of 
debris than observed (Wise, 2018). In any case an uncontrolled crash gives rise to a random 
horizontal walk near the end-point of the line reaching the sea surface 1-2 minutes later 
(Steel, 2016). This is in excellent agreement with a sound feature recorded at the nuclear 
arms listening device HA01 near Cape Leeuwin (34.892˚ South, 114.153˚ East) at 
00:49:42. With a water-sound-speed of 1.484 km/s expected along this passage (Steel, 
2016) the plane should crash 114 s after 00:19:37 at our south-eastern solution to match the 
recording. This corresponds to a downwards speed of roughly 15000 fpm and a crash time 
of 1:54 min. Such a moderately rapid crash fits the average fragment size. In contrast, no 
sound features agree with the southern routes. 
  Finally the eye witness (Tee, 2014) describes a large airplane diving to low height and 
flying slowly west of her boat located north of Bandar Aceh at (6.628˚ North, 94.438˚ East, 
plus 15 km east-northeast due to later time) on the night MH370 disappeared. It came from 
north, made a moderate turn nearby towards her and disappeared somewhere south without 
landing. The plane had a red halo around it and the normal lights and windows could only 
be seen in the cockpit while the rest looked strange. Considering diffraction of red warning 
light and small windows in the cabin versus white (green) light in large cockpit windows 
puts the diagonal distance between her and the plane around 2.5 km. She estimates a 3-km 
horizontal distance. These observations agree with our southeastern solution, where the 
plane makes a 6.3˚ turn 17 km north of her position while diving and causing delay, and 
passes 2 km west of her boat. Only the time does not fit. She puts the closest approach at 
19:20 while our model says 20:59. This is also essential to get spatial agreement due to the 
movement of her boat perpendicular to the predicted flight route. However, she was 
particularly uncertain about the time, so it is not an unlikely error in an area where local 
time-zones in India and Indonesia deviate two hours within a few km of her position. 
 
 
6.  DISCUSSION.  For the optimum Christmas Island solution we estimate that the model-
placing-uncertainty is ±35 km along the 6th arc. The maximum error will therefore be 
roughly ±70 km (2σ), which we use as the (half)-length of the search zone. For the 
transverse extend we propose ±15 km, since the largest contribution to this uncertainty is 
second-order placing error (found experimentally to be 1/6 leading to ±6 km) followed by 
random walk uncertainty after 00:19:37 (±3 km) and fitting uncertainty (±3 km) giving a 
total of ±7.5 km transverse uncertainty, and again choosing the double for the extend of the 
search zone. It is worth noting that all data point to positions within the central 10 % of the 
search zone with the largest deviation coming from Kate’s observation leading to a point 
4-8 km south of the centre of the zone. As a funny coincidence a 5-km shift south will 
perfectly align the straight flight with an end-point at Coral Bay Airport and roughly 
remove the 8-km offset at MEKAR (Iannello, 2017). We therefore guess there will be a 
relatively high chance of finding the plane within 350 km2 out of the 3500 km2. 
  There is also something special about the Christmas Island route going through the 
intertropical convergence zone (Schneider et al., 2014) where satellite detection and long-
range radar are hampered by tropical thunderstorms, indicating intelligent planning. Most 
likely the perpetrator(s) also knew about the handshakes and deliberately directed and 
timed the flight to get close to the worst possible mathematical data-entanglement with 
satellite movement through spatial correlation, making it almost impossible to find the 
plane because this allows for a multitude of solutions with similar fitting quality. This was 
achieved by flying a route resembling a magnification of the satellite ground projection 
curve with the SDU restarting as the plane left Malaysian radar coverage and entered this 
route. The U-turn was carefully aligned to match the top of the satellite projection curve, 
and the immediate continuation was slightly curved, followed by a straight flight to the end, 
pointing to perpetrator(s) with knowledge of entanglement (Wikipedia-3) and (Kristensen 
et al., 2012). Interestingly, flight simulation data found near the captain’s private computer 
(Steel, 2016), (Iannello, 2017) and (Wise, 2018) resembles a classical analogue of a 
quantum Singlet-entanglement (anti-correlation) with the satellite motion while the actual 
route matches a Triplet-entanglement (correlation) providing optimum hiding (Kristensen 
et al., 2012). However, combination of several scientific methods with topology 
optimization (Plougmann and Kristensen, 2004) and (Bendsøe and Sigmund, 2003) 
allowed discovery of the Christmas Island route and its identification as the best solution. 
  In case one would also go for a repeated search near the end of the southern route, the 
placing-uncertainty is 2.5 times larger due to non-Euclidean effects. This leads to a search 
zone area of 20000 km2 which is close to the original official estimate of 25000 km2 (ABC, 
2017). However, most of it was already part of previous search zones so a much smaller 
area will be sufficient. 
  To further strengthen evidence for our solution it is possible to do one of the following 
things: 
 
1) Ask how the received signal strength can go up with increasing atmospheric travel 
distance from 20:41 to 00:11 with reference to the (Inmarsat, 2015) coverage? 
2) Look for coincidence with sound recorded at Scott Reef or HA08 near Diego Garcia. 
Unfortunately data for the relevant times is not publically available. 
 
  If one such coincidence is found classical triangulation pinpoints the exact crash-site to a 
few km. However, it is the local in-coupling in the sound-guiding layer of the ocean which 
is most important – not the distance. Underwater mountains north of the expected crash-
site may cause most coupling in southern direction and add some confusing echo. For a 
weak signal this potentially prevents identification. 
  After effectively completing this manuscript, a method was published for analysis of 
sound propagation in water to determine impact-distances with only one detector (Kadri et 
al., 2017) including application for a partial re-analysis of the data from HA01 on the night 
MH370 disappeared. There is a deviation of 2 minutes between their time axis and 
previously published data from HA01 (Steel, 2016). If the new axis is correct, MH370 
crashed exactly as the last handshake was interrupted rather than 114 s later, and the 
distance to the satellite projection would be roughly 11 km shorter due to smaller h, 
predominantly via equation (3). However we suspect there is an error in (Kadri et al., 2017) 
since the distance calculated for the stronger neighbouring peak seems to be off by roughly 
200 km as pointed out by some bloggers (Iannello, 2017) consistent with a 2-minute error. 
Alternatively it is possible that the two signals accidentally coincided, which may explain 
the distance-discrepancy by interference. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION.  In conclusion, we have used a novel combination of methods from 
science and engineering to disentangle and discuss all four solutions to the model of the 
disappearance of flight MH370. For the two stable solutions we have delivered rigorous 
proof of their placing and validity by using a non-Euclidean version of Pythagoras. All 
other publically available data point to the Christmas Island solution, while we rule out the 
other three. The southern route is second-best but still unlikely, and the decision to stop 
searching was correct (ATSB, 2017). Resumed searching at that location makes only little 
sense, since the probability of finding the plane will be around 1% according to our 
estimates. We propose instead a new, focused search zone of 3500 km2 centred at (13.279˚ 
South, 106.964˚ East) with slightly elliptical shape along the 7th arc and a total length of 
140 km and width of 30 km. The probability of finding the plane there is above 90%. 
 
 
8.  NOTE ADDED IN PROOF II.  Based on discussions with several bloggers (Iannello, 
2018-2) and other independent investigators after the publication of the first version of our 
manuscript on ‘How to find MH370?’, and additional research into specific details of the 
subject, we decided to rewrite the ‘Note added in proof’ paragraph to correct some errors 
and update the available information. The rest of the original manuscript remains 
unchanged. 
  Initially we reanalyzed the connection between different routes and the observations by 
Kate Tee using the speeds found by Victor Iannello for different end-positions at the 
seventh arc (Iannello, 2017). Hereby we found that only routes ending between 26° S and 
32° S could be consistent with her observations if they were after the particular gybe she 
points out. Only routes leading to latitudes between 11° S and 16° S could be consistent if 
her observations were instead made after the following gybe. All other possibilities lead to 
inconsistency with her observations. 
  As part of the same analysis, we looked at possible agreement with the sound-features at 
Cape Leeuwin. The most likely feature is only consistent with end positions between 12° 
S and 15° S, while one of other two (much less likely) peaks could move the end-position 
down to 16.5° S (maximum). All other proposed end-positions are inconsistent with the 
observed peaks. Trusting the input from Kate Tee (except gybe number) this makes our 
solution at 13.3° S most likely, and practically rules out any solution between 20° S and 
25° S. A statistical analysis including other information from e.g. the unsuccessful seabed 
searches (details not included here) leaves only 2.2 % probability of finding the wreckage 
between 20° S and 25° S. 
  Secondly, it became clear from discussions with bloggers (Iannello, 2018-2) that the 
method we presented for calculating the BFO for different routes than the Inmarsat solution 
was inaccurate. It needs an additional correction for the local speed of the airplane. 
Furthermore, it is unclear if the method we used for handling a pressure-induced shift 
(presented in the first version of this paragraph) is correct. Concerning both these issues, it 
is extremely important to keep in mind that the errors are relatively small, and that due to 
the small weight put on the BFO in the topology-optimization, these errors will only lead 
to small shifts of the final position. However, it is still important to make the corrections 
properly for two reasons. First of all, there is a risk that the effects may exceed the 
perturbative regime, so another one of the four possible end positions overtake the role as 
the best fit. Secondly, even if the corrections only lead to shifts within the measurement 
uncertainty, they may still add significant extra search time and cost for a resumed search 
if handled incorrectly. 
  The procedure for the speed correction is simple to first order. Because the speed on the 
route towards 13.3° S is 3.1 % lower than for the Inmarsat solution, the net (internally 
calculated) Doppler shifts reduce by this amount. The first-order correction for this bring 
our BFO values very close to those calculated by Victor Iannello (Iannello, 2018-2). There 
is still an insignificant deviation around 2 Hz due to smaller effects. In the following, we 
will ignore this effect since it is far below the statistical uncertainty. However, the 3.1 % 
correction is clearly significant, and in case one only looks at the BFO (by letting the 
weight-factor on BTO go to zero), one finds Victor Iannello’s original 27° S solution from 
2016 as the optimum fit. 
  Since the BFO values are much less accurate than the BTO values, and their detailed 
interpretation is somewhat uncertain, this is clearly not a good approach. By instead 
choosing to keep our original 1000-fold lower weight on the BFO, one gets a much smaller 
shift (around 20 km south) near our 13.3° S solution. This seems like a completely 
insignificant shift, but it is unfortunately still so large that it becomes incorrect to use a 
first-order perturbative approach, and the chi-squared values for the southern solutions get 
significantly closer to each other. It is unclear how to handle this situation without a 
complete reanalysis from the bottom, but before doing this, it is essential to consider the 
impact of other perturbations from possible changes in pressure and temperature in the 
cabin. 
  Looking at the 13.3° S solution it is obvious that the entire solution only makes sense if 
an attempt to bail out by parachute took place while flying at low height near Bandar Aceh. 
This would have left one of the doors behind the wings open, leading to significant drops 
in pressure and temperature as the airplane returned to 11 km flying height. It is unclear 
how to handle the pressure change (we are increasingly convinced our previous approach 
was inadequate), but since it is most likely around 2 Hz (sign unknown), we choose to 
ignore it using the same arguments as for the other 2 Hz deviation above. However, the 
temperature change is clearly significant. Bloggers (Iannello, 2019) found a shift for the 
double-isolated oscillator of 0.3 Hz/K. In addition, there is an expected shift in the power-
amplifier output for the SDU (not actively temperature-stabilized) of -0.02 dB/K (Weinreb 
and Harris, 1986). One of the bloggers (Iannello, 2019) calculated a temperature drop of 
60 K inside an open cabin, which we agree on provided the heat supply systems were ‘off’. 
However, we do not agree on this result if all the internal systems were in normal mode. 
The reason is that the heating system will try to counteract the temperature drop by going 
to maximum output. This will reduce the temperature drop more or less depending on the 
details (which door was open, exact placing of the SDU, and detailed settings for the 
heating and air supply systems). It is impossible to guess all these details, so the only 
solution is to look for scientific ways to determine independently the temperature at the 
SDU position. 
  In this context there is one additional (and practically overlooked) parameter measured by 
the Inmarsat system, namely the received power. In order to use this, it is necessary to 
develop a model for the emission pattern for the antenna at the airplane. We did this using 
the pattern calculated by (Harvey, 1963). A recent paper by (Fu, 2012) presents a more 
accurate model, but unfortunately only for an asymmetric modification of the antenna 
design. However, near the maximum of the antenna gain curve it is still accurate. Based on 
these two inputs we made a simple, robust model for the antenna gain curve, which is 
proportional to the cosine of the satellite elevation angle (Ashton et al., 2014), and 
proportional to the square root of the cosine to the (in plane) angle from the emission 
maxima. We are assuming front-back mirror symmetry, and the antenna aligned with the 
body of the airplane. We fitted this model to the three handshakes before the airplane 
disappeared to determine the only unknown parameter (the maximum forward power in 
normal operation). Please note that the angles given in the Inmarsat paper are not precise, 
but adapted to fit the BFO values. We found agreement with all three points within an 
uncertainty of 0.35 dB, which seems in accordance with typical values for such a satellite-
antenna system. 
  We used the fitted peak power to determine the expected power for all the following 
points. Ignoring the re-booting points, we found good agreement with the rest with four 
exceptions. The largest deviation is at 19:41 (2.7 dB). This means that the power received 
at this point is roughly eight sigma higher than expectations. This is an enormous effect, 
which is impossible to explain unless the airplane was making a sharp turn at this time. 
Since the BFO value at 19:41 does not indicate a turn the most likely explanation is that 
the final major turn must have started immediately at 19:41. This is in perfect agreement 
with our route towards 13.3° S. Furthermore, both our specifically proposed U-turn and the 
large power-disagreement indicate a counterclockwise turn with an inward acceleration of 
0.2 g (again in perfect agreement with the route towards 13.3° S, but in strong disagreement 
with other proposed routes). For the two points at 21:41 and 22:41, we find 0.9 dB 
disagreement (slightly less at 21:41, which may be due to the proximity of a tropical 
thunderstorm giving a small amount of plasma damping (Xiong et al., 2016)). None of the 
proposed routes includes turns at these times, and the BFO values are perfectly in 
agreement with straight flight without height changes at these times. Therefore, the only 
plausible explanation for the majority of the effect is that the temperature in the cabin is 
reduced providing higher power output from the SDU. A simple division gives a 
temperature drop of 45 K, which is entirely reasonable if the heating system is on and one 
of the rear doors open. 
  Now we use the estimated temperature drop to calculate the oscillator shift to -13.5 Hz. 
This means that we must subtract 13.5 Hz from the calculated (negative) Doppler shift to 
correct for this effect. As part of the development of the original version of this paper, we 
derived a simple formula for the end-position shift due to a 1 Hz shift for all the last four 
points. This reads one-degree latitude (towards north) to compensate each negative Hz 
added. The Inmarsat paper comes out with a 25% larger value, but that is for one point 
individually, and the continuity and straightness of the curve reduces the collective value 
by roughly 25%. This means that any solution calculated based on BFO (alone) must be 
shifted 13.5 degrees north to correct the effect of the temperature drop. Performing this 
operation on Victor Iannello’s original solution gives a shift to 13.5° S, which is only 0.2° 
from our solution. 
  Finally, we simultaneously make the 3.1 % Doppler correction and add -13.5 Hz to the 
last four points (21:41, 22.41, 23:14 and 00:11) and get a net southward shift of 5 km for 
our 13.3° S solution, which happens to fit exactly with our preferred ‘end-destination’ in 
Coral Bay. This shift is so small that it is well within the perturbative regime. Therefore, 
we do not need to perform a deep reanalysis of the entire problem. 
  However, there is one important detail missing. The point at 00:11 actually fits with the 
expected power output and contradicts our conclusions. How is that possible? After careful 
thinking, we came up with only one possible explanation. At 00:11 the first engine had 
already flamed out, knocking the autopilot out so the airplane automatically turned nearly 
10 degrees attempting to compensate the (maximum skew) engine push. If the airplane was 
in the alternative electrical configuration this is in agreement with the Boeing simulation 
case 4 (Iannello, 2018-1) and provides the correct microwave power loss. However, this 
would mean that the SDU also lost electrical power before 00:11 in contradiction to 
observations, so how is that possible? The only way is if the right engine flamed out before 
00:11, the plane was in the alternative electrical configuration, and the SDU manually 
connected to the left generator. 
  Now the big question is if this is a wild speculation or a fact. First, we looked at the reboot 
at 18:25. A couple of experts (in particular the blogger DennisW at Iannello’s blog) have 
been complaining vigorously about the normal booting for the SDU. If the left power 
generator had been off to allow faster flight at high altitude along the Thai-Malaysian 
boarder, the cabin would have been extremely cold and at low pressure during the SDU 
booting, which would lead to severe oscillator drift for a prolonged period. Never the less 
the booting is normal as shown by Holland. A nice explanation is if the SDU was re-
connected at a later (convenient) time when the cabin was back in normal condition but 
now manually to the original left power supply. This is consistent with Radar observations 
between Penang and MEKAR of an increasingly normal flight along waypoints after the 
fast, high, and slightly noisy (manual?) flight before Penang. 
  While this is in good agreement with the SDU moved back to the left generator, there are 
still some remaining details. This succession of events leads to a clockwise crash spiral 
similar to case 4 in the list of Boeing simulations (in contrast to the rest of the Boeing 
simulations ending in counterclockwise spirals), and places the debris roughly 13 km 
further south and somewhat west. We initially guessed 10 km west, partly from arc 
curvature, partly due to height loss at 00:19. In total, this gives an 18-km south and roughly 
10-km west shift compared to our original position if we ignore the turn in direction before 
00:11. Including this turn and longer than expected section adds roughly 18-km additional 
shift towards west giving a total of 28 km. 
  The important remaining problem is that most experts may still feel this entire explanation 
is pure speculation. In order to settle the question, we used our refined knowledge of the 
end-scenario to look for matching contrails form the airplane in satellite pictures. 
  We successfully found contrails matching our solution until briefly after 00:00 in two 
consecutive pictures from the METEOSAT-7 weather satellite (Weather Graphics, 2014), 
followed by a turn to the right around 00:08, and ending in a spiral 34 km west and 16 km 
south of our calculated position in good agreement with our refined findings. Figure 6 
illustrates this contrail with the highly interesting added feature that it becomes abruptly 
thinner and more intense at 00:08, exactly as the right engine flames out, the power of the 
left engine increases to maximum and the turn takes place. This provides strong 
circumstantial evidence that the contrail comes from MH370 running out of fuel. 
  The satellite pictures also contain a contrail from another flight coming from southeast 
and flying directly over the airport at Christmas Island. Based on the measured speed, exact 
timing and angle (extracted from its contrails) we have identified this contrail as coming 
from a flight leaving Melbourne at 5:00 am local time heading for Dubai. Nowadays, this 
flight has the code EK409, operated by Etihad with an Airbus A380, explaining the more 
intense contrail than the one form MH370. 
  In order to help observers inexperienced with looking at contrails in satellite pictures we 
have made a PowerPoint cartoon switching between a composite picture with locally 
selected data from the satellite picture with most clear contrail signal (taken at 00:00 or 
00:30), and the following picture taken at 01:00, where the contrail has evaporated in the 
sunshine as reference. The extreme left stripe of the reference picture is replaced with data 
from the 00:30 picture to suppress strong, confusing leftover form the Melbourne-Dubai 
contrail. The end position in the middle of the spiral is marked with a yellow star. A dashed 
red-orange line briefly flashes over the contrail until an arrow at 00:08 to help guide the 
eye. The brightness of the pictures have been adjusted to match each other, and the edges 
smoothened by two pixels to suppress confusing artificial vertical lines. The cartoon starts 
automatically by pressing F5. It is important to notice that the cartoon is optimized to 
promote contrail-clarity. This leads to reduced precision in the flight angle due to wind-
induced drift near the inter-convergence zone. Figure 6 provides better angular precision 
since it uses only the satellite picture from 00:30. However, it provides less contrail contrast 
to the inexperienced eye. 
  
Figure 6.  Illustration of two contrails found near Christmas Island at the time MH370 crashed in the region. 
The dashed white line is flight EK409 from Melbourne to Dubai. The yellow line represents a flight coming 
from North-Northwest, making a moderate southerly turn and ending in a spiral South-Southeast of 
Christmas Island. The times and positions of this flight agree closely with our model (5-7, white stars) for 
MH370, and the turn angle and simultaneous reduction in thickness and increase in strength agree nicely 
with our additional findings. 
 
  The position, time and turning angle at 00:08 (6-10 degrees considering wind-
corrections), and simultaneous narrowing and intensification of the contrail, and the 
detailed properties of the connected spiral, are close to our findings (above) based on the 
power levels measured by Inmarsat and our original modelling of the BTO and BFO values. 
The extracted speed, timing and flight angle for the airplane before 00:08 also fit nicely 
with our previously calculated values for MH370 (total position deviations are only around 
5-10 km as shown in figure 6 and furthermore consistent with the additional corrections 
described above). If we add a 5-km westerly shift to the old result together with the other 
corrections above, the data fit perfectly with the contrails (only 1-2 km off). We are 
therefore practically sure this is a direct recording of the end-scenario and crash position 
for flight MH370. We find the center of the spiral at (13.42° S, 106.66° E) from the weather 
satellite picture. The heavy debris is with 98 % probability located at the seabed within a 
radius of 10-15 km of this position, and it should be possible to find within less than one 
day of searching. 
  In hindsight, this detailed solution also solves a number of smaller contradictions in the 
data. First, the downward acceleration found by Holland around 00:19:37 seemed 
inappropriate compared to the Boeing simulations at that stage of a crash. Knowing from 
the power level at 00:11 and the contrails that the first engine flamed out a few minutes 
earlier than expected (around 00:08) brings this in better agreement with the Boeing 
simulations. Secondly, the termination in a tight spiral dive shown by the contrails rules 
out an active pilot ditching the airplane far from the seventh arc. Thirdly, the remaining 2 
Hz deviation from Iannello’s result may be partly due to the pressure shift. Fourth, the 13.5 
Hz temperature shift explains why the initial BFO plots from the Inmarsat paper deviated 
10-15 Hz from the measured values. Finally, the clockwise crash together with the SDU 
moved to the other power generator practically proves that it was a deliberate act, and not 
an accident. 
  As an added curiosity, the contrail from MH370 crosses the other contrail at an angle of 
13 degrees roughly 240 km northwest of Christmas Island, and the two airplanes must have 
been close enough for visual contact in light from the rising sun. It would be highly 
interesting having a chat with the pilots flying Melbourne to Dubai, since they might have 
seen MH370. 
  Concerning agreement with the peak recorded at Cape Leeuwin the 16 km shift 
southwards would make the feature appear roughly 11 s earlier, but the 34 km shift west 
partly compensates this. The remaining shift of a few seconds towards earlier time is too 
small to have any impact, so the agreement remains excellent. 
  Concerning the beaching pattern of debris the westward shift will bring the debris very 
close to the maximum wind-field of hurricane Gillian. We are unable to calculate precisely 
the pattern shift, but qualitatively it will greatly improve agreement with observations. 
  A few open questions remain. Most importantly, whether the perpetrator(s) knew leaving 
a door open shifted the BFO so it exactly matched the simulation in captain Shahs 
computer, and knew to eliminate suspicious oscillator drift and inconvenient handshake 
timing by connecting the SDU at the right time. If this were the case, we are dealing with 
a highly sophisticated, well prepared, and deliberate act of mass killing with scientific input 
to manipulate the data and mislead the investigators, not a simple attempt to hide a suicide 
or an act of terrorism. The motive and fate of the perpetrator(s) also remain open questions. 
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